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Abstract 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction of market power in different market 
structures and how this market power diminishes because of international trade and the effects on 
welfare.  A review of relevant literature from Pugel (2012), McConnel Bruce and Flynn (2012) 
and Bernheim and Winston (2014) provides the effects of international trade on the market 
power conditions in different market structures and the effects on welfare. Asprilla, Berman, 
Cadot and Jaud (2016), Devereux and Lee (2001) and Krugman (1994) serve to provide further 
evidence through PTM literature, bilateral exchange rate shocks and protectionism. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Repercussions of International Trade on the Market Power of Firms in Different Market 
Structures. 
Introduction 
A firm can use its market power to set the domestic price in accordance with the 
prevailing market structure to maximize its profit. A firm with a position that gives it significant 
market power would loathe to part with it even though when the firm exercises market power, it 
can cause a reduction in countries welfare. According to Asprilla (et.al 2016), “The argument 
that trade policy affects competition is a not new one” (p.1). Hence, for such a firm international 
trade and policy can prove to a be a long-term problem that requires constant strategic focus. 
Furthermore, this problem stays true for firms in other market structures such as oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition and not only for a firm that maintains a pure monopoly position.  
Firms in monopolistic competition and oligopoly also experience the effects of an open 
macro economy and international trade and policy. In the short run these effects can be 
disastrous if there exists no macroeconomic policy coordination. If there does exist coordination 
between the firm, the state and the international community then in the long run the firms may 
develop the resources to compete in open macroeconomic conditions if incentives exist and the 
loss of aggregate surplus is not of significant concern. This paper examines the relevant literature 
pertaining to market power, market structures, international trade and shows how international 
trade reduces market power and the effects of trade on consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
welfare. 
 
 
 
Running Head: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MARKET POWER  4 
Literature Review 
Market Power Conditions in Different Market Structures 
Most firms in business have inherent market power. According to Bernheim and Winston 
(2014), “A firm enjoys market power when it can profitably charge a price that is above its 
marginal cost”. (P. 590) or P>MC. This definition serves as an anchor because any adverse 
conditions affecting price or marginal cost will cause its market power to change. One of the 
major reasons for market power is the availability of substitutes. The availability of substitutes 
makes the product more elastic and the firm is at risk of losing market share. Opening of trade to 
allow substitutes in a country is a definite way to reduce a monopolist’s market power. Two of 
the main market structures where market power is most prevalent is in monopoly and oligopoly 
markets.  
Market Power in Monopoly. A firm that has monopoly power in a domestic market 
stands to lose the most from open macroeconomic conditions and international trade. According 
to McConnell, Bruce and Flynn (2012) the key distinguishing features of a pure monopoly are, 
“being a single seller, no close substitutes, price maker, blocked entry and non-price 
competition.”. (p 195). The profit maximization condition for a pure monopoly is when 
P=MR=MC and the market power of the pure monopolist allows it to charge the price and 
produce and sell at that quantity. The welfare effects of the price maximization lead to a 
reduction in aggregate surplus. 
Market Power in an Oligopoly. If a monopoly firm loses market power and hence the 
conditions that make it a pure monopoly are not valid the firm may suddenly find itself in an 
oligopolistic market structure. This may happen because of international trade and open 
macroeconomic conditions as firms are now able to enter the market. According to McConnell, 
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Bruce and Flynn (2012) an oligopoly, “is a market dominated by a few large producers of a 
homogeneous or differentiated product. Because of their fewness they have considerable control 
over their prices” (p.223). The welfare effects of oligopoly pricing are a lower aggregate surplus 
although less than a monopoly. 
Firms in an oligopoly market are still a “price maker” like the monopolist and can set 
their own prices and output to maximize profit. Although unlike a pure monopoly which has no 
rivals in an oligopoly the firm must take into consideration the reaction of its rivals in the market 
when planning to change its price, if it sets it higher it is not able to sell if it sets it lower then 
there is fear of undercutting. Hence, the oligopolistic markets are characterized by “strategic 
behavior and mutual interdependence”.  Even in an oligopoly, firms face pressure on their 
market power position due to international trade. If due to international trade the number of firms 
grows larger than according to Bernheim and Winston (2014), “As the number of firms in a 
Cournot oligopoly grows larger the price falls, approaching marginal cost when the number 
grows very large.” (703).  
Market Power in Monopolistic Competition. As we can see that opening up of trade 
can completely change the market structure the firm operates in. As trade liberalization occurs 
more and more firms will enter the market if there is an incentive to do so. More firms lead to the 
market structure changing to one of monopolistic competition, which is characterized by further 
limited market power and onwards to pure competition with zero profit in the long-run. One of 
the most important of analysis of monopolistic competition was conducted by Edward 
Chamberlain and expanded upon by Paul Krugman a Nobel Laureate.  
Pugel, provides an explanation of Krugman “monopolistic competition describes an 
industry with three characteristics that include “product differentiation, internal economies of 
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scale and easy entry and exit.” (96).  It is evident that international trade can make the firm focus 
its recourses towards product differentiation to maintain its market power, although the firm can 
realize internal economies of scale the market structure is still one which allows easy entry and 
exit.  
Effects of International Trade and Policy on Market Power and Market Structures.  
As introduced earlier the opening of international trade can have a drastic effect on a 
firm’s market power. Pugel provides us with an excellent case study that uses Ford as an 
example of a pure monopoly that in turn ends up into a pure competition with close to zero 
profits in the long run and this is termed as, “From No Trade to Free Trade”, Asprilla (et.al) 
provides evidence of changes in market power and structures through a study of bilateral 
exchange rate shocks, Devereux and Lee (2001) discuss both the gains and losses on 
international trade and a resulting increase or reduction of market power and Krugman (1994) 
uses Bhagwati’s model to determine the effects of protectionism and market power.   
Trade Policy and Market Power: Firm-Level Evidence. Asprilla (et.al) provide a 
novel approach to the argument that competition is affected by trade. Aware of the complication 
that arise when measuring market power, oligopoly and game theory, “We identify market power 
by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets in reaction to variations in 
bilateral exchange rates.” (p. 1). Their findings conclude that, “More importantly we provide 
robust evidence trade policy deeply affects market structure. In accordance with theory and 
intuition, exporters faced with tariffs on their destination markets to significantly less PTM, 
revealing a loss of market power consistent with rent-shifting effects.” (p. 24). (See Appendix III 
for technical data). Hence, the study proves to be an excellent example that shows that trade 
policy can significantly affect market power depending on what policy instruments are used.   
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Gains, International Trade and Market Power. The evidence of domestic market 
power being present leads to two inefficiencies.  Devereux and Lee (2001), “First, the excess of 
price over marginal cost will bias down the steady-state capital stock; … Second, because firms 
interact strategically with one another, the industry markup will depend on the size of the market 
leading to high-entry”. This generates an inefficient level of entry into each industry.” (P. 240). 
Since imperfect competition causes inefficiency as well as additional welfare loss, the 
government may find it prudent to open its border to international trade to reduce the level of 
inefficiency and increase welfare. The model shows that international trade can induce welfare 
gains by facilitating international competition. (See Appendix II for technical data). The analysis 
is built on the premise that international trade reduces the market power of domestic firm. 
According to Devereux and Lee (2001), “Markusen (1981), trade tends to increase competition 
and reduce monopoly price-setting in economies where domestic firms have monopoly power” 
(p.239).  
 Protection and Domestic Market Power. From the many literature reviews and studies 
done on the subject matter, many economists have concluded that international trade decreases 
market power of domestic firms and that protection increases the market power of firms. The 
Bhagwati Model reviewed by Krugman (1994) examines this relationship using a graphical 
analysis. (See Appendix I for the graph and technical descriptions). The Bhagwati Model shows 
that the monopolist cannot charge a price higher than the world price. Hence, the profit 
maximizing strategy for the monopolist is to set the marginal cost equal to the world price. In 
this case the monopolist has no market power. Furthermore, the monopolist can exercise its 
market power if a quota is imposed but not when a tariff is imposed. 
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Discussion 
Scope of the Study. 
 The scope of the study although not exhaustive covers sufficient ground to gives us a 
grasp of the effects of international trade on market power. There is a review of the market 
power positions in different market structures and we follow or intuition to the logical conclusion 
that as a country opens its self to international trade, it becomes harder and harder for the 
monopolist to hold on to its market power. Furthermore, three independent studies provide us 
with the same conclusion using different methods. Aprilla (et.al) provides an analysis of market 
power through bilateral exchange rate shocks. Devereux and Lee (2001) measure the gains in 
welfare occurring from international trade and reduction in market power and Kruger (1994), 
uses Bhagwati’s model to show the limitation that the monopolist faces in changing price levels 
and the effects on market power of tariffs and quotas. 
International Trade, Strategic Management and Business and Public Policy. 
 There is considerable evidence to the fact that a firm’s market power is diminished due 
international trade. Since, maintaining a position on market power is a strong strategic focus, a 
firm who has held a domestic monopoly can use its resources to lobby for protectionism. If such 
lobbying is successful we may see measures such as tariffs which limit the imports and at the 
same time provide the government with revenue albeit inefficiently. In most cases the 
government favors a position that limits inefficiency and promotes international trade, but there 
are many examples where protectionism has been in place for a long period of time and 
imperfect completion exists. Pugel illustrates in a case study as to how sugar prices in the US are 
twice as much as that of world prices even though by letting the price equalize would only a 
displace a limited amount of people in the US who could easily transition to other industries but 
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may lead to the increase of aggregate surplus on an international level. Although the country may 
consider the protection of sugar production as a strategic objective regarding self-sufficiency and 
public interest. 
Conclusion 
We examine how international trade and policy diminish a firm’s ability to retain its 
market power and bring about change in market structures themselves. There is also evidence to 
support the claim that the government may find it advantageous both to intervene to increase 
welfare either through protectionism or opening to international trade. Therefore, it would be 
advisable to conduct studies aimed in the direction of strategic management, international trade 
and business policy. Such studies may also determine how the strategic management focus of the 
firm changes and if sustainability of the business is possible in the long run. The advent of such 
studies and the data gathered will ensure better decision making both on the firm level, national 
level and in the international community. Macroeconomic policy coordination is prevalent in 
maintaining international EU economies as Pugel has introduced, hence the effects of these 
results if monitored for welfare and international trade may also provide additional insights on 
market power, international trade policy and strategic management. 
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Appendix I. 
Bhagwati’s Model from Krugman (1994) – Rethinking International Trade. 
Fig 14.3 
  
Figure D is domestic demand curve facing the monopolist. MC the monopolist’s marginal cost 
curve. Pw is the world price, namely, the price at which imports are supplied to the domestic 
market. Pz is the price that it would obtain if all domestic demand were supplied by monopolist, 
but the monopolist we’re to behave as a price taker. Pm is the price the monopolist would charge 
if there were no import competition.  
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Appendix II. 
Dynamic Gains from International Trade with Imperfect Competition and Market Power. 
Devereux and Lee (2001) 
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Appendix III. 
Trade Policy and Market Power: Firm Level Evidence. Asprilla, Berman, Cadot and Jaud (2016).  
 
 
Exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT) is a measure of how responsive international prices are to 
changes in the exchange rates.  
The results are shown in Figure 1. In market with low-impact NTMs (first three bars on 20 the 
left), exchange rate pass-through is almost complete, except in tariff-free markets where it 
declines slightly to around 90% (1-0.1). Pass-through becomes strongly incomplete and shrinks 
to as low as 60% (1 − 0.4) in markets with zero tariffs but high-impact NTMs (last three bars on 
the right). 
 
